Increasing demands for cost-effectiveness in surveillance for human health hazards can be met by 1ntroducmg nsk-based principles . This 1mphes target1ng subpopulat1ons w1th h1gher nsk of Infection compared to the whole population. We demonstrate how historical data from surveillance can be used to assess risk of infection. The model is called "Discounting historical evidence" and depends mainly on two variables: Annual risk of introduction Plntro and surveillance system sensitivity SSe (ability to detect infection if present). The model Implies simulations that reiterate for a number of years, and for each year the output is updated with the confidence on absence of infection . Trichmella sp1ralis infect1on in p1gs IS used as an example. In Denmark, pigs at slaughter are tested (currently 23 mill1on per year), and despite of > 70 years of sampling no pigs have been found positive. Hence, we concluded that Plntro 1s low. SSe can be estimated from the maximum number of infected carcasses expected under the spec1fied design prevalence, and the sensitiv1ty of the test applied . According to the assessment, the prevalence of Trichmella in Dan1sh pigs is negligible (<1 case/ million). Based on this , a risk-based surveillance programme for Tnchmella is des1gned that targets all out-door reared pigs as well as all sows and boars (currently 610,000 per year). Compared to confined pigs, outdoor-reared pigs have higher nsk of getting Tnchinella because of their exposure to wildlife , wh1ch m1ght harbour Tnchmella . Sows and boars are at increased risk, because they live longer than fimshers . Again , SSe and Plntro are estimated and the model is used to show how risk-based surveillance can be applied w1thout jeopardizing human health. Finally, we Incorporate wildlife surveys and test quality assurance in the programme . The model results are included in an application to the European Commission concern1ng Denmark's status as a reg1on w1th negligible risk of Trichinella .
Introduction
Tnchinella sp1ralls IS a zoonotic infection that previously constituted a common nsk in many parts of the world . In Denmark, the surveillance programme for Trichinella 1s based on 1ndiv1dual sampling of all pigs delivered to an export authorised abattoir. An increasing number of pigs have been surveyed since 1930, initially by use of the compression method, and since the 1970s by the digestion method (currently 22 m corresponding to 99% of the annual production). No p1gs have ever been found positive dunng the more than 70 years that the programme has been in place. The question is whether a more cost-effective surveillance can be designed without jeopard1s1ng human health Such surveillance should be risk-based , 1.e. 1t should target the sub-populat1on(s) with the highest risk of Trichinella smce the a1m 1s to detect mfect1on 1f present. The question 1s how a risk-based approach would affect the ability to detect infection.
The present analys1s a1med to: 1) Demonstrate that Denmark as a reg1on has a negligible risk of Trichinella infection in domestic pigs 2) Design a risk-based surveillance system that is able to identify Trichinella infection 1n the national p1g herd if it were present at a level above the chosen des1gn prevalence
Method
A model called "Discounting historical evidencep was used for the analyses. The model was developed in connection with an Epilab Research Project in Copenhagen (Martin et al., in press}. In the following , the model will be explained in more detail.
Two variables are of importance for the model: 1) the annual probability of introduction of Trichinella-Plntro 2) the sensitivity of the system (SSe) i.e. the surveillance system's capacity to identify Trichinella once the infection is present in the national pig herd above the level of the chosen design prevalence p• In each scenario, 10,000 simulations were run using the software programme @Risk (Palisade Inc.).
The choice of parameters describing Plntro in the current surveillance was based on the fact that Trichinella has not been found in Denmark since 1930 (Maddox-Hyttel et al., 2003 . The probability of infection next year (Pintro) can then be conservatively estimated as: 1 I (waiting time since last outbreak}. corresponding to 1/76=1 .3%. To account for variation in Plntro an interval of± 25 years was used, corresponding to a probability range of 1.0% to 2.0%. This approach captures changes in risk during the 76-year period of surveillance (the risk of introduction may have varied over the years). but since the current system has prevented introduction for 76 years, an estimated annual risk varying between 1.0% and 2.0% is considered a conservative estimate.
In a risk-based surveillance programme for Trichinella for slaughter pigs, outdoor-reared pigs as well as sows and boars will be sampled. Outdoor-reared pigs harbour a higher risk of introduction because of the possibility of contact with wildlife. Sows and boars are at increased risk because they have a longer possible exposure period compared to finishers. Wildlife surveys conducted in Denmark in 197 4-75 (Maddox-Hyttel et al., 2003 ), 1996 -97 and 1998 -99 (Enemark et al., 2000 all revealed a very low (<0.1 %) Trichinella prevalence m red foxes. This suggests a stable situation in the sylvatic Trichinella cycle in Denmark Raccoon dogs Nyctereutes procyonoides typically show a higher prevalence and larval burden of Trichinella than foxes. The raccoon dog is currently not established as a species in Denmark but it is expected to spread into Denmark in the future. The exact magnitude of the increased risk of introduction from wildlife to outdoor-reared pigs compared to Indoor-kept pigs IS unknown. We therefore chose to model the risk as an interval, where the lower bound of Plntro was set at tw1ce the risk that we found for Indoor-kept pigs: PlntrOoots•de = 2 x Plntro,ns1do = 2 x 1/76 years = 1/38 years = 2.6%. As the upper bound of Plntro we used 3 x Plntroms1de corresponding to 3.9%. Again, both bounds should be regarded as conservative estimates.
The surveillance system sensitivity (SSe) in the current surveillance can be estimated from the number of mfected carcasses expected among the tested under the specified design prevalence, and the sensitivity of the test applied. We estimated that the prevalence of Trichinella in Denmark is negligible. According to EFSA (2005) this corresponds to less than one case per million individuals. Therefore, a design prevalence of 1/m was chosen. According to the literature, the test sensitivity might be as low as 40% in case only 1 g of pig muscle is sampled, and only few encapsulated Trichinella larvae are present (3-5 larvae/g). If more larvae are present, or larger amounts of meat are digested , then the sensitivity is much higher than 40% (see Forbes & Gajadhar, 1999) . To account for variability we assumed that the sensilivity of the mdiv1dual lest varied from 35% to 45%.
Based on the Information about the expected number of infected animals and the sensitivity of the mdividual test, the system sensitivity 1n the present surveillance that includes all finishers was est1mated to be 99.99% (Table 1 ) . We assumed a design prevalence (P•) of 1/m, implying that if Trichinella infection were present, the prevalence would be ~1/m. This 1mplies that at least 23 Infected p1gs are expected within a population of 23 m pigs. Because of the epidemiology of Tnchinella, we expect that the mam part of the 23 infected p1gs w1ll be present among the outdoorreared pigs as well as the sows and boars. We assumed that 2/3 of the mfected pigs would be found here corresponding to 15 out of the 23 infected p1gs. Using these assumptions, the riskbased surveillance system chosen will have an SSe of 99.95% (Table 2) . Table 1 Estimated surveillance system sensitivity (SSe) for Trichmella in Danish pig production in the currents stem that mvolves testin of almost all 1 s current! 99% SSe = Prob(identifying infection) = 1-Prob(overlooking infection) = 1-(1-Se)
Where. The Simulation model updates the probability of Infection 1n the national herd every year based on a combmat1on of the probability of infection at the end of last year with the probability of Introduction during the spec1fic year. In the first year (1990) we assume that we have no knowledge of the Infection, 1t m1ght be present or not. 1 .e. we set the probability of mfection to 50%, which is a very conservative est1mate, s1nce no cases have been found 1n the preceding 60 years. In each of the following 16 years we survey the pigs and do not find any positive pigs; by do1ng so we mcrease our confidence that we do not have the infection in the nat1onal pig herd, including our outdoor p1g population.
Resu lts
According to the s1mulat1on model there is a probability of 98.6% that the national pig herd in Denmark currently is free from Trichinella (Probability of free adJusted 95% Cl : 98.1 %-99.0%). A high degree of confidence IS obta1ned already after one year Th1s is ma1nly due to the large sample size. Hence, the risk is entirely dnven by the annual risk of introduction Plntro, wh1ch is estimated to 1 3%. In a Simulation of the effect of nsk-based surveillance, the probability of freedom from infection is again set to 50% 1n the first year, to s1mulate a s1tuat1on without pnor knowledge. Because of annual sampling with no pos1t1ve findings the probability that the national pig herd IS free from Tnchmella 1n a nsk-based sampling scheme Increases to 96.7% after one year and rema1ns stable thereafter (95% Cl : 96.1%-97 3%). This IS a slightly lower probability than in the current system. Again , the nsk IS ent1rely driven by the annual risk of introduction Plntro, wh1ch is estimated at between 2.6 and 3.9% (mean 3.3%). As with the current system, the risk-based surveillance achieves a high level of sensitivity after just one year.
Discussion and conclusion
As pointed out by a previous risk assessment report (EFSA, 2005) , the existence of true Trichinella-free areas/countries is very unlikely, because even though Trichinella may be absent in domestic pigs it may still be present in wildlife. What we can conclude from our simulations based on surveillance data from a 76-year period with increasing intensity is that the prevalence in domestic pigs in Denmark has been negligible and that Denmark is a low-risk area for Trichinella in pigs for slaughter. Therefore, risk-based sampling targeting sub-populations with higher risk is justified.
Sampling the entire population of 160,000 outdoor-reared pigs plus 450,000 sows and boars only gives a slightly lower confidence instead of sampling 23 m indoor-reared pigs. The negligible risk of infection among confined (i.e. indoor-reared) finishers is due to the strict biosecurity in place in Danish indoor pig herds. Hereby, outdoor-reared pigs will act as a sentinel for infection of Trichinella in the national herd. Similarly, testing of 450,000 sows and boars will act as an indicator of infection in individual herds in the event of infection in wildlife and biosecurity failing to prevent introduction of Trichinella. The sows and boars will be tested for Trichinella no matter if they are raised in confinement or outdoors, and no matter where they are slaughtered (export slaughterhouse or local butcher).
The model by Martin et al. (in press ) assumed an "all other things equal" situation. For Trichinella, it may be argued that the advent of the raccoon dog means an increased risk of Trichinella transmission. If an infected raccoon dog harbours more Trichinella larvae than foxes (Oivanen et al., 2002) , and if this results in a higher degree of exposure of outdoor pigs, then there is a higher likelihood that infection will be identified through the surveillance system in place. Moreover, the decreasing number of pig farms in Denmark will inevitably lead to larger indoor farms with better biosecurity.
